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BRINGING MEANING TO FIRST NATIONS CON-




One aspect of the legal relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal 
SHRSOHVLVWKHGXW\WRFRQVXOW7KLVGXW\LVSDUWRIWKHRYHUDOOÀGXFLDU\
duty that the Crown owes towards Aboriginal people. The recent Supreme 
Court of Canada decision of Haida v. British Columbia brings the duty 
WRFRQVXOWLQWRIRFXVVSHFLÀFDOO\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIVDOPRQDTXDFXOWXUHLQ
%ULWLVK&ROXPELD'LIÀFXOWLHVDULVHZLWKUHJDUGVWRWKHSUHFLVHFRQWHQWRI
the duty to consult:  is it merely procedural in nature, or do First Nations 
have a substantive right to consultation? The extent of consultation and 
accommodation will be determined proportionally to the strength of 
the claim and the seriousness of the potential infringement. The Haida 
FDVHFRQÀUPVWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIWKH&URZQWRDFWKRQRXUDEO\DQGWR
effect reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, as 
has been established in previous Canadian Aboriginal jurisprudence. 
&RQVXOWDWLRQ LV SUDFWLFDOO\ GLIÀFXOW EHFDXVH RI WKH IDFW WKDW VDOPRQ
aquaculture regulation is divided amongst several government agencies. 
This paper explores the question of how much input Aboriginal peoples 
should have and what the nature of accommodation might look like if an 
Aboriginal band were to protest salmon aquaculture in its territory.  
† Mark Rappaport (B.Sc., University of Victoria) received his LL.B. from Dalhousie Law 
School in 2005..
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The salmon aquaculture industry in British Columbia has been wrought 
with controversy from its infancy.1 At the heart of this controversy are 
questions surrounding the industry’s sustainability, including its effects 
RQ WKH HQYLURQPHQW DQG ZLOG SDFLÀF VDOPRQ2 Traditionally, govern-
PHQWVKDYHKDGGLIÀFXOW\DGGUHVVLQJWKHVHLVVXHVEHFDXVHWKHDTXDFXO-
ture industry is serviced under various Constitutional heads of power, 
resulting in a regulatory regime that is haphazardly divided between the 
Federal and Provincial governments.3 In order to address this lack of 
vertical integration, the Provincial and Federal governments signed a 
0HPRUDQGXPRI8QGHUVWDQGLQJLQZKLFKLGHQWLÀHGDQXPEHURI
coordination duties.4 Conspicuously absent from the Memorandum of 
Understanding, however, was mention of a role for First Nations to play 
in regulating the industry.5 
In this paper I will discuss the Crown’s legal obligations and the 
ÀGXFLDU\GXW\RZHGWR)LUVW1DWLRQVSHRSOHLQFOXGLQJWKH&URZQ·VWUD-
ditional approach toward consultation. I will examine how the recent 
decision of Haida v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests)6 could be 
used as a tool by decision-makers to help facilitate reconciliation of 
Crown and Aboriginal interests in the context of salmon farming in Brit-
ish Columbia.
I. DEFINING THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP
Prior to 1982, the rights of Aboriginal peoples in Canada could be abol-
ished by an Act of Parliament. In an attempt to protect Aboriginal inter-
12ULJLQDOO\WKHLQGXVWU\ZDVSRRUO\UHJXODWHGDQGWKHUHZDVOLWWOHVFLHQWLÀFXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
SRWHQWLDOHQYLURQPHQWDO LPSDFWV7KLVOHGWRVLJQLÀFDQWSXEOLFFRQFHUQDQGVHYHUDOPRUDWRUL-
ums on issuing licences and several government reviews of the industry. See British Columbia 
5HSRUWRIWKH(QYLURQPHQWDO$VVHVVPHQW2IÀFHSalmon Aquaculture Review Summary, vol. 1 
(Victoria: Queens Printer, 1997) at 1-3.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 David VanderZwaag, Gloria Chao and Mark Covan, “Canadian Aquaculture and the Principles 
of Sustainable Development: Gauging the Law and Policy Tides and Charting a Course” (2002) 
28 Queen’s L.J. 279.
5British Columbia, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, “Salmon Aquaculture Review 
Final Report”, online: Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries <http://www.agf.gov.bc.ca/
ÀVKHULHVVWXGLHVBUSWVBGHWDLOKWP!
6 245 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 2004 SCC 73 [Haida].
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ests from the arbitrary will of the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada 
GHÀQHGWKHOHJDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHWZRSDUWLHVDVÀGXFLDU\LQQD-
ture, in Guerin v. The Queen.7:KLOHVRPHKDYHFULWLFL]HGWKLVÀGXFLDU\
relationship as overly patriarchal, the Guerin decision established a le-
gal principle for assessing the legitimacy of Crown actions with respect 
to Aboriginal peoples. After Guerin, the Crown was legally required to 
DFW LQ WKHEHVW LQWHUHVWVRI$ERULJLQDOSHRSOHV7KH&URZQ·VÀGXFLDU\




In 1982, Aboriginal rights were elevated to Constitutional status 
through s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.9 While entrenching Abo-
riginal rights in the Constitution has indeed helped to protect them from 
the political whims of the majority, it has also placed the heavy burden 
RILQWHUSUHWLQJWKRVHULJKWVRQWKHMXGLFLDU\7KHÀUVWIUDPHZRUNIRULQ-
terpreting section 35 rights was established by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. Sparrow.10 Dickson, C.J. and La Forest, J. concluded 
WKDW WKH WHUPV´UHFRJQLWLRQDQGDIÀUPDWLRQµ LQV LQFRUSRUDWHG WKH
&URZQ·V ÀGXFLDU\ REOLJDWLRQ11 Further, the Court created a four-part 
test to assess the legitimacy of Crown actions, whether those actions 
interfered with the interests of an Aboriginal right and, if so, whether 
WKH\FRXOGEHMXVWLÀHG
7KH$ERULJLQDOFODLPDQWÀUVWKDVWKHRQXVRISURYLQJWKH$ERULJLQDO
right and infringement; the onus then shifts to the Crown to prove that 
the right has been extinguished or, alternatively, that the interference is 
MXVWLÀDEOH12 In Sparrow the Musqueam Band was successful in proving 
WKDWWKH\KDGDQ$ERULJLQDOULJKWWRÀVKIRUVDOPRQDQGWKDWWKH*RYHUQ-
ment had interfered with it.13 In interpreting the nature of s. 35(1) rights, 
the court clearly stated that they should “be construed in a purposive 
way [and that] a generous, liberal interpretation of the words in the con-
7 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
8 Roberts v. R., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245, 220 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at para. 81.
9 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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stitutional provision” should be given. In other words, section 35 rights 
should not be interpreted as being frozen in time.14 Moreover, Dickson 
C.J. in Sparrow notes that,
[s]ection 35(1) at the least provides a solid constitutional base upon 
which subsequent negotiations can take place … it calls for just 
settlement of Aboriginal peoples … Moreover, the crown is under a 
moral if not a legal duty to negotiate in good faith.15 
In R. v. Van der Peet, the Supreme Court of Canada elaborated on the 
nature of section 35(1), noting that its fundamental purpose is “the rec-
onciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the sover-
eignty of the Crown.”16
2QHRI WKHPRVW VLJQLÀFDQW DVSHFWVRI$ERULJLQDO ULJKWV OLWLJDWLRQ
has been the determination of the nature and scope of the Crown’s duty 
to consult Aboriginal peoples regarding potential infringements. The 
content of the duty to consult for established title claims was addressed 
in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. There, Dickson C.J., for the ma-
jority, held that:
[t]he nature and scope of the duty of consultation will 
vary with the circumstances. In occasional cases, when 
the breach is less serious or relatively minor, it will be 
no more than a duty to discuss important decisions that 
will be taken with respect to the land held pursuant to 
Aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when 
the minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this 
consultation must be in good faith, and with the intention 
of substantially addressing the concerns of the Aboriginal 
peoples whose land are at issue. In most cases, it will 
EH VLJQLÀFDQWO\ GHHSHU WKDQ PHUH FRQVXOWDWLRQ 6RPH
cases may even require the full consent of an Aboriginal 
nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting and 
ÀVKLQJUHJXODWLRQVLQUHODWLRQWR$ERULJLQDOODQGV17 
14 Ibid. at para. 56.
15 Ibid. at para. 53.
16 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 31, [1996] 9 W.W.R. 1 [Van der Peet].
17 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para. 168, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
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While these decisions shed a great deal of light on the legal relationship 
EHWZHHQWKH&URZQDQG$ERULJLQDOSHRSOHVWKH\OHDYHPDQ\VLJQLÀFDQW
TXHVWLRQVXQDQVZHUHG6SHFLÀFDOO\ZKDW LV WKHH[WHQWRI WKH&URZQ·V
obligation to consult with First Nations in the context of the salmon 
aquaculture industry? Is the requirement procedural or do First Nations 
have a substantive right to consultation? Does the obligation to consult 
exist at all if the potentially affected Aboriginal right has not yet been 
proven in law? How will the obligation to consult be affected if it is un-
clear whether salmon farming could infringe upon a claimed right? For 
the remainder of this paper I will address these questions in an attempt 
WRGHÀQHWKHOHJDOULJKWVRI$ERULJLQDOSHRSOHVLQWKHVDOPRQDTXDFXO-
ture decision-making process.
II. HAIDA AND THE DUTY TO CONSULT
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent unanimous decision in Haida 
IXUWKHUGHÀQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHGXW\WRFRQVXOWDQGDFFRPPRGDWHDVEH-
ing “grounded in the honour of the Crown.”18 Chief Justice McLachlin 
noted that while section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, “represents a 
promise of rights recognition … a corollary of s. 35 [is that] the Crown 
DFW KRQRXUDEO\ LQ GHÀQLQJ WKH ULJKWV LW JXDUDQWHHVµ19 The reason for 
this is twofold. First, “it is always assumed that the Crown intends to 
IXOÀOOLWVSURPLVHVµ20 Second, the Crown must act honourably if it is to 
achieve the purpose of s.35, that is, “the reconciliation of the pre-exist-
ence of Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”21 
Chief Justice McLachlin further states that, “the honour of the Crown 
gives rise to different duties in different circumstances. Where the Crown 
KDVDVVXPHGGLVFUHWLRQDU\FRQWURORYHUVSHFLÀF$ERULJLQDOLQWHUHVWVWKH
KRQRXURIWKH&URZQJLYHVULVHWRDÀGXFLDU\GXW\µ22 Where it has not, 
the honour of the Crown implies “a duty to consult and, if appropriate, 
accommodate,”23 if an Aboriginal right or title may be infringed.
18 Supra note 6 at para. 16.
19 Supra note 6 at para. 20.
20 Supra note 6 (quoting from R. v. Badger [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, 4 W.W.R. 447 at para. 41).
21 Supra note 6 at para. 17 (quoting from Van der Peet at para. 31).
22 Supra note 6 at para. 18.
23 Supra note 6 at para. 20.
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The Court then addressed the Crown’s argument that a legally en-
forceable duty to consult does not exist until a right has been proven. 
Chief Justice McLachlin stated at paragraph 33: 
[t]o limit reconciliation to the post-proof sphere risks treating 
reconciliation as a distant legalistic goal, devoid of the “meaningful 
content” mandated by the “solemn commitment” made by the 
&URZQLQUHFRJQL]LQJDQGDIÀUPLQJ$ERULJLQDOULJKWVDQGWLWOH«,W
also risks unfortunate consequences. When the distant goal of proof 
LVÀQDOO\ UHDFKHG WKH$ERULJLQDOSHRSOHVPD\ÀQG WKHLU ODQGDQG
resources changed and denuded. This is not reconciliation. Nor is it 
honourable.24 
As to when, precisely, the duty to consult arises, the Court cites Halfway 
River First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) and states, 
“the duty arises when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of 
the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates 
conduct that might adversely affect it.”25 
Chief Justice McLachlin then addresses the issues of the scope and 
content of the duty to consult and accommodate. Essentially, she notes 
that the scope of the duty to consult is proportional to the strength of 
the claim and the seriousness of the potential infringement.26 At one end 
of the spectrum, where the asserted right is tenuous and the potential 
LQIULQJHPHQWLVPLQLPDOWKH&URZQ·VGXW\WRFRQVXOWPD\EHVDWLVÀHG
by merely “giving notice, disclosing information, and discussing any 
issues raised in response to the notice.”27 In these situations the duty to 
consult appears to be primarily procedural in nature. At the other end of 
the spectrum, where an Aboriginal claimant has a “strong prima facie” 
FDVHDQGWKHSRWHQWLDOIRULQIULQJHPHQWLVVLJQLÀFDQWWKHQWKHLQWHUHVWV
of the claimant may have to be accommodated rather than merely con-
sulted. 
Accommodation in the context of a strong prima facie claim and a 
VLJQLÀFDQWSRWHQWLDOIRULQIULQJHPHQWPHDQV´WKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRPDNH
submissions for consideration, formal participation in the decision-mak-
24 Supra note 6 at para. 33.
25 Supra note 6 (quoting from Halfway River [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 45, [1998] 4 W.W.R. 283 
(B.C.S.C), at para. 35).
26 Supra note 6 at para. 39.
27 Supra note 6 at para. 43.
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ing process, and provision of written reasons [by the Government] to 
show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to reveal the impact 
they had on the decision.”28 While at this end of the spectrum the right 
WRFRQVXOWDWLRQLVVLJQLÀFDQWO\PRUHVXEVWDQWLYHLQQDWXUHWKH&RXUWLV
clear that “this process does not give Aboriginal groups a veto over what 
FDQ EH GRQHZLWK ODQG SHQGLQJ ÀQDO SURRI RI FODLPµ29 According to 
McLachlin C.J.,
[t]he controlling question in all situations is what is required 
to maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples with respect to the 
interests at stake. Pending settlement, the Crown is bound by its 
honour to balance societal and Aboriginal interests in making 
decisions that may affect Aboriginal claims.30
I will now examine how this balancing of societal and Aboriginal inter-
ests might play out in the salmon aquaculture context.
III. THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND SALMON AQUACULTURE 
POLICY
The manner in which the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate 
Aboriginal peoples may affect salmon aquaculture policy is guided by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Haida. For the remainder of this pa-
per I will address the issues of how and when decision makers should 
consult Aboriginal people, the level of input Aboriginal peoples should 
have in the decision making process, and how a Minister’s decision to 
grant salmon aquaculture licenses and tenures could be affected by a 
band who protests salmon aquaculture. Further, I will argue that the 
duty to consult and accommodate could compel the Crown to adopt best 
management practices regarding salmon farming, including subsidizing 
closed system aquaculture facilities, in limited situations.
28 Supra note 6 at para. 44.
29 Supra note 6 at para. 42.
30 Supra note 6 at para. 45.
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31 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director) (2002), 211 
D.L.R. (4th) 89 (B.C.C.A.) rev’d (2004) 245 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Taku River].
32 Land and Water British Columbia Inc., “Aboriginal Interests Consideration Procedures” (Sept. 
8, 2003), online: Land and Water British Columbia <ww.lwbc.bc.ca/04community/fn/docs/aicp.
pdf >. Refers to the BCCA decisions in Haida and Taku and states that the Provincial Policy for 
Consultation with First Nations, October, 2002 takes into account those decisions.
33 Government of British Columbia, “B.C. Provincial Policy for Consultation with First Na-
WLRQVµ2FWREHURQOLQH%ULWLVK&ROXPELD7UHDW\1HJRWLDWLRQV2IÀFHKWWSZZZJRY
bc.ca/tno/down/consultation_policy_fn.pdf> at 25.
34 Ibid. at 19.
35 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-22.
1. When and how should aboriginal peoples be consulted 
regarding proposed salmon aquaculture projects?
While the Crown argued in Haida and Taku River31 that a legal obliga-
tion to consult did not exist until the Aboriginal claimant had proven an 
Aboriginal right, they amended their Provincial Policy for Consultation 
WR UHÁHFW WKH%ULWLVK&ROXPELD&RXUWRI$SSHDO·VGHFLVLRQ LQERWKRI
those cases. Those decisions held that there was in fact a duty to consult 
prior to the proven existence of an Aboriginal claim.32 Accordingly, the 
British Columbia Provincial Crown’s Policy for Consultation with First 
Nations now acknowledges that, “the depth of consultation and degree 
to which workable accommodations should be attempted will be pro-
portional to the soundness of that interest.”33 The Crown’s policy also 
acknowledges that, “consultation should be carried out as early as pos-
sible in the decision-making process.”34 Both of these principles uphold 
the honour of the Crown and are consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Haida. 
Because the regulation of salmon aquaculture is divided amongst 
so many different government agencies, one is left to question how the 
consultation process is administered to achieve a consistent result. Cur-
rently, there are two major provincial agencies, one provincial Crown 
Corporation and one federal agency that are responsible for regulating 
the industry. The B.C. Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection regu-
lates the use of water permits, Land and Water B.C. Inc. issues land 
use tenures, the B.C. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods is-
sues aquaculture licenses, and the Federal Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans issues permits under the Navigable Waters Protection Act35 and 
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the Fisheries Act.36 Environment Canada may also become involved if 
issuance of a Federal permit triggers an environmental assessment.37 
While it may not be necessary for all agencies to consult in the most 
HIÀFLHQWPDQQHU RQHZRXOG DVVXPH WKDW FRQVLVWHQF\ LV DQ LPSRUWDQW
element of honourable consultation. Traditionally, each agency respon-
sible for granting a permit or issuing a license consulted with potentially 
affected First Nations groups separately. Recently, however, there has 
been a move toward an integrated consultation process. The Provin-
cial and Federal governments are currently working on a harmonized 
consultation policy for aquaculture that will be available some time 
in 2005.38 It is anticipated that this move toward integration will en-
hance the consistency of the consultation process and the honour of the 
Crown’s conduct.
2. What level of input should aboriginal peoples have in the 
decision making process?
Although the answer to this question depends on the context of the situ-
ation, a few broad generalizations can be made. First, as the obligation 
to consult is proportional to the strength of the asserted claim and the 
SRWHQWLDOIRULQIULQJHPHQWRQHPXVWÀUVWHVWDEOLVKDQ$ERULJLQDOULJKW
or title that could be affected. In the context of a salmon aquaculture 
IDFLOLW\RQHULJKWWKDWFRXOGEHSRWHQWLDOO\LQIULQJHGLVWKHULJKWWRÀVK
for wild salmon.  
It is likely that many coastal First Nations groups will be able to es-
WDEOLVKDQ$ERULJLQDOULJKWWRÀVKZLOGVDOPRQIRUIRRGDQGFHUHPRQLDO
purposes. This is supported by several factors. First, as Philip Drucker 
notes in his book &XOWXUHVRIWKH1RUWK3DFLÀF&RDVW“exploitation of 
WKHÀVKHULHV SDUWLFXODUO\ VDOPRQ² WKHPRVW DEXQGDQWÀVK²ZDV WKH
FUX[RI1RUWK3DFLÀF&RDVWHFRQRP\µ39 In addition, salmon were spir-
LWXDOO\FHQWUDOWR1RUWK3DFLÀF&RDVWSHRSOHV'UXFNHUDOVRQRWHV´RI
all the priest-conducted rites of group interest, the most important was 
36 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, cited in VanderZwaag, supra note 4.
37 VanderZwaag, supra note 4 at para. 47.
38 Interview of Sean Herbert, Aquaculture Manager for BC Ministry of Water, Land and Air 
Protection, (Nov. 22, 2004).
39 Philip Drucker, &XOWXUHV RI WKH1RUWK3DFLÀF&RDVW (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing 
Company, 1965) at 11.
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DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHDUULYDORIWKHÀUVWVDOPRQHDFK\HDUµ40 Accordingly, 
LW LV OLNHO\ WKDWPDQ\ÀUVWQDWLRQVJURXSVRQ WKH3DFLÀF&RDVWZRXOG
EHDEOHWRHVWDEOLVKDQ$ERULJLQDOULJKWWRÀVKIRUVDOPRQEHFDXVHWKH
SUDFWLFHKDVEHHQFHQWUDODQGLQWHJUDOWRWKHOLYHVRIPDQ\1RUWK3DFLÀF
Coast peoples since before contact with Europeans.41 
Moreover, Aboriginal claimants are not required to produce indis-
putable evidence from pre-contact times to establish an Aboriginal right 
or title. Rather, the evidentiary burden requires the claimant to prove 
claims “on the basis of cogent evidence establishing their validity on 
the balance of probabilities.”42 For example, in Heiltsuk Nation v. Brit-
ish Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management), Justice 
Gerow accepted the oral history of the Heiltsuk at face value and deter-
mined that they had “a strong prima facie case of Aboriginal rights to 
ÀVKLQWKHDUHDµ43 
7ZR DGGLWLRQDO IDFWRUV VXSSRUW WKH OLNHOLKRRG WKDW VHYHUDO 3DFLÀF
&RDVWEDQGVZRXOGEHDEOHWRHVWDEOLVKDULJKWWRÀVKIRUVDOPRQ)LUVWLV
the Sparrow decision itself, in which the Musqueam band successfully 
HVWDEOLVKHGDQ$ERULJLQDOULJKWWRÀVKVDOPRQIRUIRRGDQGFHUHPRQLDO
purposes.44 Second is the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Aborigi-
QDO)LVKHULHV6WUDWHJ\ZKLFKUHÁHFWVWKHSparrow decision in a broader 
FRQWH[WE\DOORFDWLQJSULRULW\WR$ERULJLQDOIRRGÀVKHULHVRYHUWKHFRP-
mercial sector. 
Therefore, assuming that it will be likely that many bands will be able 
to establish a strong prima facie FODLPWRÀVKIRUZLOGVDOPRQWKHRSHU-
ating question becomes: What is the likelihood that a decision to grant a 
salmon aquaculture license will infringe the Aboriginal right to harvest 
wild salmon? As noted above, the onus is on the Aboriginal claimant to 
prove the likelihood of an infringement. In order to answer this question 
it is imperative to establish a detrimental link between farmed salmon 
DQGZLOGVDOPRQ7KLVLVGLIÀFXOWEHFDXVHDOWKRXJKWKHUHLVDJUHDWGHDO
40 Ibid. at 94.
41 ‘Central and integral since pre-contact times’ is the test to establish section 35(1) Aboriginal 
rights as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Van der Peet, supra note 16 at para. 44.
42 Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at para. 
51.
43 Heiltsuk Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management) (2003), 
19 B.C.L.R. (4th) 107 (S.C.) at para. 64 [Heiltsuk].
44 Supra note 10.
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of public opposition to salmon farming, there is also a great deal of sci-
HQWLÀFXQFHUWDLQW\UHJDUGLQJWKHHIIHFWVRIWKHLQGXVWU\RQZLOGVDOPRQ
However, McLachlin C.J. states in Haida this is not as problematic as it 
may seem. She maintains that ´GLIÀFXOWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHDEVHQFH
RISURRIDQGGHÀQLWLRQRIFODLPVDUHDGGUHVVHGE\DVVLJQLQJDSSURSULDWH




hensive assessment of salmon aquaculture practices. The study evaluat-
HGÀYHPDMRUFRQFHUQVUHJDUGLQJVDOPRQDTXDFXOWXUHLQ%&LQFOXGLQJ
the impact of escaped farm salmon on wild stocks, disease in wild and 
IDUPHGÀVKHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVRIZDVWHGLVFKDUJHGIURPIDUPVLP-
pacts of farms on coastal mammals and other species, and the situating 
of salmon farms. The conclusions of the Salmon Aquaculture Review 
(SAR) were as follows:
[s]almon farming in B.C., as presently practiced and at current 
production levels, presents a low overall risk to the environment. 
+RZHYHU WKLVJHQHUDOÀQGLQJLV WHPSHUHGE\FHUWDLQUHVHUYDWLRQV
First, continuing concern about localized impacts on benthic 
VHDEHG RUJDQLVPV VKHOOÀVK SRSXODWLRQV DQG PDULQH PDPPDOV
suggests the need for additional measures to protect them. Second, 
VLJQLÀFDQW JDSV LQ WKH VFLHQWLÀF NQRZOHGJH RQ ZKLFK >WKHVH@
conclusions are based point to the need for monitoring and research 
in areas such as the potential impacts of escaped farmed salmon 
ZLWK ZLOG SRSXODWLRQV LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ DQG FRQWURO RI GLVHDVH DQG
disease pathogens, potential for disease transfer … Science rarely 
KDVWKHDELOLW\WRUHDFKGHÀQLWLYHFRQFOXVLRQVRQWKHULVNRUSRWHQWLDO
severity of the consequences of human interactions with complex 
ecosystems … Direction is provided by the precautionary principle 
which advocates the consideration and anticipation of the potential 
negative impacts of an activity before it is approved.46 




45 Supra note 6 at para. 37.
46 Supra note 1 at 4.
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ary approach toward the industry, the SAR implies that some risk to 
wild salmon exists. Still, the duty to consult would likely fall closer to 
the procedural end of the spectrum as the risk of infringing the right to 
harvest wild salmon appeared low. 
Since the SAR, however, there has been new research to indicate 
WKDWVDOPRQDTXDFXOWXUHPD\LQIDFWSUHVHQWDJUHDWHUULVNWRZLOGÀVK
than previously believed. Two recent observations support this conclu-
sion. First, in 1997, PhD student John Volpe discovered that escaped 
Atlantic salmon have spawned in several rivers on Vancouver Island 
DQG LQ VRPH FDVHV WKRVH ÀVK KDYH HVWDEOLVKHG VHOIVXVWDLQLQJ SRSX-
lations. In laboratory experiments Volpe also determined that Atlantic 
salmon out-compete their native niche equivalent, the steelhead salmon. 
His experiments suggest that Atlantic salmon pose a greater risk to wild 
salmon than was previously believed.47 
One year later, Alexandra Morton, a biologist who lives in the 
Broughton Archipelago, became alarmed at the negative effects of the 
ÀVKIDUPVLQ WKHDUHD ,QSDUWLFXODUVKHZDVFRQFHUQHGE\ WKHDE-
normally large number of sea lice that she discovered on juvenile pink 
salmon, and that she believed was attributable to a disease outbreak 
in the local farms. She presented her evidence to the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans, but they denied that anything was wrong. Two 
years later when the age class of pink salmon returned to the Broughton 
Archipelago the stock had collapsed from 3.5 million to 147,000, a re-
duction of 96% from previous years.48 As a result, the DFO has begun 
researching the sea lice problem in the area but has not yet attributed the 
RXWEUHDNWRWKHDUHD·VÀVKIDUPV49 While Morton’s research is circum-
stantial, a number of reputable scientists agree with her conclusions. 
In 2000 both Morton and Volpe undertook a study to determine the 
number of Atlantic salmon that had escaped in Management Area 12 
and the degree of risk that farmed Atlantics posed to the natural environ-
PHQW0RUWRQDQG9ROSHFRQWDFWHGFRPPHUFLDOÀVKHUPHQYLDVHF and 
47 John P. Volpe. Invasion Ecology of Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar) in British Columbia. Ph.D. 
Thesis. University of Victoria, B.C. 2001.
48 Earth Crash Earth Spirit, online: <http://eces.org/articles/000003.php> and Prince Rupert.
com, North Coast’s Regional Information Site, online: <http://www.princerupert.com/econo-
my/Morton_responds_Hagen.htm>.
49'HSDUWPHQWRI)LVKHULHVDQG2FHDQV&DQDGD´3DFLÀF5HJLRQ3LQN6DOPRQ$FWLRQ3ODQ,Q-
troduction to and Weekly Results of the Marine Research Project in 2004,” online: <http:// 
www-sci.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/mehsd/sea_lice/2004/2004_intro_e.htm>.
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by visiting boats during commercial salmon openings from August 2, 
2000 to September 22, 2000. During that period a total of 10,826 Atlan-
WLFVDOPRQZHUHGLVFRYHUHGLQGD\VRIRSHQÀVKLQJ50 
These three new discoveries demonstrate that the risk posed by 
salmon farming to wild salmon is greater than previously believed. 
7KHUHIRUHVLQFHWKHSRWHQWLDOIRULQIULQJLQJDQ$ERULJLQDOULJKWWRÀVK
for salmon has increased with new evidence, so too should the Crown’s 
corresponding duty to consult. If we assume that more evidence will 
accumulate, the level of consultation required by the Crown to issue 
salmon farm permits would likely reach the level of accommodation. 
The Provincial Policy for Consultation with First Nations acknowledges 
the responsibility to accommodate where a sound case for Aboriginal 
rights has been established and there appears to be a likelihood that the 
decision may result in an infringement of those interests.51 However, the 
Crown’s policy does not detail what ‘accommodation’ means in prac-
tice. For this we can turn to Haida for guidance: accommodation may 
include formal participation in the decision making process but does 
not constitute a right to veto. Accordingly, in the hypothetical situation 
where an Aboriginal claimant has a strong prima facie FODLP WR ÀVK
for wild salmon and the likelihood of infringing that right by issuing a 
VDOPRQIDUPLQJSHUPLWLVVLJQLÀFDQWWKHQWKH$ERULJLQDOJURXSZRXOG
likely be granted some say over how the project proceeds.
3. How will the decision to grant a salmon farm license be affected 
by a band that protests salmon aquaculture in its territory? 
Evaluating the B.C. Supreme Court’s decision in Heiltsuk in conjunc-
tion with Haida will shed some light on this question. In Heiltsuk, the 
Heiltsuk Nation brought an application for judicial review asking the 
Court to quash the Minister’s decision to grant licenses to Omega Salm-
RQ*URXS/WG2PHJDWRRSHUDWHDFRPPHUFLDOÀVKKDWFKHU\LQWKHLU
territory. The Heiltsuk claimed unproven Aboriginal rights and title to 
50 Alexandra Morton and J.P. Volpe, “A description of Atlantic Salmon Salmo salar in the Pa-
FLÀFVDOPRQÀVKHU\LQ%ULWLVK&ROXPELD&DQDGDLQµ$ODVND)LVKHU\5HVHDUFK%XOOHWLQ
102-110, 2002.
51 Supra note 33 at 32 and 33.
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52 Supra note 43 at para. 108.
53 Supra note 43 at para. 64.
54 Supra note 43 at para. 95.
55 Supra note 43 at para. 94.
56 Supra note 43 at para. 93.
57 Supra note 43 at para. 91.
58 Supra note 43 at para. 91.
59 Supra note 43 at para. 104-105.
60 Supra note 43 at paras. 98 and 102.
61 Supra note 43 at para. 100.
the land where the hatchery was located,  and opposed any type of At-
lantic salmon aquaculture in their territory.52 The Heiltsuk claimed that 
they had not been adequately consulted with, and that the decision to 
JUDQWWKHOLFHQVHVZRXOGLQIULQJHXSRQWKHLU$ERULJLQDOULJKWWRÀVKIRU
VDOPRQDQGRWKHUW\SHVRIÀVK
In assessing the nature of the Heiltsuk’s claim, Justice Gerow ac-
cepted the oral history of the Heiltsuk at face value and determined that 
they had “a strong prima facie FDVHRI$ERULJLQDOULJKWVWRÀVKLQWKH
area.”53 The Court then turned to whether the Heiltsuk had shown an 
infringement of their claimed right. Here, the band failed to produce 
enough evidence showing that the proposed activity would infringe 
WKHLUFODLPHGULJKWWRÀVK)LUVW-XVWLFH*HURZSRLQWHGRXWWKDWWKHSUR-
posed facility was land based and, as such, the likelihood of interaction 
EHWZHHQWKHKDWFKHU\UDLVHGÀVKDQGZLOGÀVKZRXOGEHUHPRWH54 Sup-
porting this conclusion was the fact that the discharge pipe from the 
hatchery to the ocean would have a triple screening system.55 The Heilt-
VXNDOVRIDLOHGWRSUHVHQWHYLGHQFHWKDWHIÁXHQWIURPWKHKDWFKHU\ZRXOG
impact the marine environment in an adverse way.56 Given that the Min-
LVWHURI)LVKHULHVDQG2FHDQVKDGFRQÀUPHGWKDWWKHDFWLYLW\ZRXOGQRW
result in “a harmful alteration, disruption, or destruction (HADDRIÀVK
habitat,”57 and that the hatchery was regulated under the Land-Based 
Fin Fish Waste Control Regulation,58 Justice Gerow concluded that the 
Heiltsuk had not established a potential infringement. 
,QGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUVXIÀFLHQWFRQVXOWDWLRQKDGWDNHQSODFH-XV-
tice Gerow highlighted the fact that Heiltsuk had a reciprocal duty to 
consult with the Crown.59 Still, while the Crown later acknowledged 
their obligation to consult, they did not initially consult with the Heilt-
suk regarding the licenses.60 Omega, however, was willing to consult 
and had made many attempts to do so.61 For Justice Gerow, the consulta-
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62 Supra note 43 at para. 108.
63 Supra note 6 at para. 48.
64 Supra note 43 at para. 126.
65 Supra note 6 at para. 47.
tion was not effective because the Heiltsuk were “opposed to any type 
of Atlantic salmon aquaculture in the territory over which they [were] 
asserting a claim … [and] have been unwilling to enter into consulta-
tion regarding any type of accommodation concerning the hatchery.”62 
Justice Gerow was skeptical that that the right to consultation contained 
a right to veto use of the land and, since Haida, it is clear that the right 
to consultation of an unproven right indeed does not carry with it a right 
to veto.63 
In the end, however, Justice Gerow adjourned the Heiltsuk’s request 
to quash the Minister’s decision until adequate consultation had taken 
place. He also dismissed the application to grant an interim or inter-
ORFXWRU\LQMXQFWLRQRQWKHJURXQGVWKDW2PHJDKDGLQYHVWHGVLJQLÀFDQW
resources into the project and the Heiltsuk did not bring their petition to 
the Court in a timely manner.64 
The Heiltsuk decision is useful because it provides some guidance 
for the hypothetical situation outlined above. Would the Court’s deci-
sion have been different if the Heiltsuk were located somewhere in the 
Broughton Archipelago and the licenses being contested were for an 
ocean-based Atlantic salmon farm? Assuming the band could establish 
a strong prima facie FODLPWRÀVKIRUZLOGVDOPRQDQGDVVXPLQJPRUH
evidence accumulates to suggest that farmed salmon are detrimental 
to wild salmon, it seems likely that the Crown’s obligation to consult 
would reach the level of accommodation. Since accommodation does 
QRWLQFOXGHDYHWRULJKWWKHULJKWWRFRQVXOWDWLRQZRXOGLQFOXGHVLJQLÀ-
FDQWLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVVDQGWKHÀQDORXWFRPH
As Chief Justice McLachlin states in Haida,
[w]here a strong prima facie case exists for the claim, and the 
consequences of the government’s proposed decision may adversely 
DIIHFWLWLQDVLJQLÀFDQWZD\DGGUHVVLQJWKH$ERULJLQDOFRQFHUQVPD\
require taking steps to avoid irreparable harm or to minimize the 
HIIHFWVRI LQIULQJHPHQWSHQGLQJÀQDOUHVROXWLRQRI WKHXQGHUO\LQJ
claim.”65 
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The government’s obligation, therefore, would be “to minimize the ef-
fects of the infringement,”66 which may mean that injunctions would 
be more easily attainable, if the potentialities of the hypothetical are 
realized.
By engaging in this question, we must ask what options the Crown 
has to minimize the effects of a potential infringement. Over the past 
several years the provincial government has experimented with several 
closed system salmon aquaculture facilities that prevent Atlantic salmon 
HVFDSHVDQGFROOHFW IDUPHIÁXHQW67 Both of these mechanisms would 
satisfy the government’s obligation to minimize any potential infringe-
ment. The traditional problem with closed systems is that they are pro-
hibitively expensive. However, statistics have recently been released 
from a pilot project conducted by Marine Harvest Canada in Cusheon 
Cove on Saltspring Island – the largest closed system salmon farming 
RSHUDWLRQLQWKHZRUOG7KHVWXG\GHWHUPLQHGWKDWLQWKHLUÀUVWDWWHPSWWR
produce closed system Atlantic salmon, operational costs were $0.85/Kg 
greater than the traditional open pen systems placed alongside the new 
technology as a control. Moreover, the study found several areas where 
costs could be reduced in future trials. For example, it is believed that 
costs can be reduced by $0.07/Kg by providing a more ready source of 
oxygen to aerate the pens.68 While $0.78/Kg represents approximately 
25% increase in cost compared to salmon produced through open net 
cage farming, it is comparably less than the premium that consumers 
pay for organic produce.69 
In the hypothetical situation above, it seems reasonable that the 
government could meet their obligation to minimize the effects of the 
infringement by subsidizing these “best management practices” in ar-
eas where Aboriginal bands protest traditional salmon farms. While 
Chief Justice McLachlin was clear in Haida that “pending settlement, 
the Crown is bound by its honour to balance societal and Aboriginal 
66 Supra note 6 at para. 47.
67 Government of British Columbia, “Fisheries and Aquaculture: New Technology”, online: 
0LQLVWU\ RI$JULFXOWXUH )RRG DQG )LVKHULHV ZZZDJIJRYEFFDÀVKHULHVWHFKQRORJ\QHZB
tech.htm>.
68 Michel Dubreuil, “Economic Performance of Atlantic Salmon in the SEA System II Relative 
to Conventional Net Cages”, online: B.C. Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries <www.
DJIJRYEFFDÀVKHULHVUHSRUWV0+B(FRQRPLFB3HUIRUPDQFHBRIBWKHB6($B6\VWHPSGI!
69 See e.g. Anna Ross, “Organic Food Prices 2002,” online: <www.domainomania.com/wfa/
downloads/Prices%20Report.pdf>.
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interests in making decisions that may affect Aboriginal claims,”70 she 
was also explicit when she stated that “the controlling question in all 
situations is what is required to maintain the honour of the Crown and 
to effect reconciliation between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples 
with respect to the interests at stake.”71 
IV. CONCLUSION
Fostering an environment where salmon aquaculture can proceed in a 
manner that supports societal interests and minimizes potential infringe-
ments of Aboriginal interests would be consistent with the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in Haida. Such an environment would maintain 
the honour of the Crown while simultaneously working towards recon-
ciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. While subsidizing 
salmon farm operations may meet public opposition, the reality is that 
many sectors of the  Canadian economy are already heavily subsidized. 
For example, the forest industry is subsidized in the range of $3 billion 
to $8 billion annually, the fossil fuel industry is subsidized approximate-
ly $5.9 billion annually, agriculture was subsidized $5.6 billion in 2000 
DQGWKHÀVKLQJLQGXVWU\ZDVVXEVLGL]HGPLOOLRQLQDQG
million in 1996.72 Furthermore, subsidies to the salmon aquaculture in-
dustry could be recaptured through eco-labeling of salmon produced 
in closed systems and charging a premium for those products.73 Given 
current opposition to traditional salmon farming in B.C., it seems likely 
that the public would support a new market that minimizes its impact on 
the environment. Moreover, a Provincial Aquaculture Policy that pro-
motes closed system salmon farms in limited situations would protect 
Aboriginal rights, bring meaning to the consultation process and help 
achieve the broader goals of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, through 
reconciliation of Crown and Aboriginal interests.
70 Supra note 6 at para. 45.
71 Supra note 6 at para. 45.
72 David R. Boyd, Unnatural Law: rethinking Canadian environmental law and policy (Vancou-
ver: UBC Press, 2003) at 320.
73 M.F. Teisl, B. Roe, and R.L. Hicks, “Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from Dolphin-
Safe Labeling” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (2002), vol. 43, no. 3 
at 339-341.
